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This essay is part of a larger project that relates to “The China Story,”
(1)
but herein I will limit myself to a consideration of a few areas in which
I believe we can find traces of the abiding, and beguiling, heritage of
the High-Maoist era and state socialism in today’s China. I review some pre-
viously published work, some of which has appeared under various scholas-
tic guises as well as in the virtual pages of the e-journal China Heritage
Quarterly (www.chinaheritagequarterly.org). (2)
In a number of interconnected spheres a nuanced understanding of what
have been called “red legacies” in China as well as more broadly can con-
tinue to enliven discussions of contemporary history, thought, culture, and
politics. In the following I will focus on recent events before offering in turn
some observations on history, the Maoist legacy, and academic engagement
with the People’s Republic.
Over the years, I have argued that the aura of High Maoism (1949-78)
has continued to suffuse many aspects of thought, expression, and behav-
iour in contemporary China. (3) This is not merely because the party-state
of the People’s Republic still formalistically cleaves to the panoply of Marx-
ism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (which, of course, it has elaborated
through the addition of Deng Xiaoping Theory, Jiang Zemin’s Three Repre-
sents, and Hu Jintao’s View on Scientific Development). I would argue that,
just as High Maoism was very much part of global revolutionary discourse
and thinking in the twentieth century, so in the post-Mao decades its com-
plex legacies, be they linguistic, intellectual, charismatic, or systemic, con-
tinue to enjoy a purchase. Furthermore, I support a view that an
understanding of Maoism in history and over time, both in terms of empir-
ical reality and in the context of memory, as well as an appreciation of its
lingering allure, remains crucial if we are to gain an appreciation of the “real
existing socialism” in the People’s Republic today.
The red patrimony
It is important to begin by situating the “Red moment” within the context
of an extended, and changing, historical narrative. While some important
recent work has noted the “long tail” of Maoist-era institutional practice, (4)
I would further affirm earlier scholarship that locates the origins and evo-
lution of what would become High Maoism from the 1950s in cultural and
political genealogies of the late-Qing and Republican eras. (5) In addition to
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* An earlier version of this essay was written for “Red Legacies in China,” a conference at Harvard
University, 2-3 April 2010, organised by Jie Li 李洁 and Enhua Zhang 张恩华 and jointly sponsored
by the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation Inter-University Center for Sinology, the Harvard-Yenching
Institute, and the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. For a report on that conference by the or-
ganisers, see: www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/scholarship.php?searchterm=022_conference.
inc&issue=022 (consulted on 10 May 2012). I am grateful to Sebastian Veg for his editorial guid-
ance and to the two anonymous reviewers of an earlier draft of this work. I would also like to ac-
knowledge Chris Buckley’s contribution to my understanding of Chongqing, the model, and its
camp-followers.
1. “The China Story” is a web-based initiative of the Australian Centre on China in the World (CIW)
launched in 2012 that includes: The China Story Lexicon, China Story Yearbook, and a China Story
Archive produced by CIW in collaboration with Danwei Media in Beijing.
2. For some of my essays relevant to this topic, see: “Time’s Arrows: Imaginative Pasts and Nostalgic
Futures,” in Gloria Davies (ed.), Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese Critical Inquiry, Boulder,
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, pp. 226-57; “The Revolution of Resistance,” in Elizabeth J. Perry &
Mark Selden (eds.), Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, London, Routledge, Taylor &
Francis Group, 2000, pp. 47-70 (rev. 2004 & 2010); “I’m so Ronree,” The China Journal, vol. 55,
2006, pp. 128-39; The Forbidden City, London UK, Profile Book, 2008 (2009, 2012); “Beijing, a
garden of violence,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, vol. 9, no. 4, 2008, pp. 612-639; “China’s Flat Earth:
History and 8th August 2008,” The China Quarterly, vol. 197, 2009, pp. 64-86’; “Beijing reoriented,
an Olympic Undertaking,” in Mary Farquhar (ed.), 21st Century China: Views from Australia, Cam-
bridge (UK) Scholars Publishing, 2009, pp. 1-33; “For Truly Great Men, Look to This Age Alone –
was Mao Zedong a New Emperor?” in Timothy Cheek (ed.), A Critical Introduction to Mao, Cam-
bridge University Press, New York, 2010, pp. 243-272; and “The Children of Yan’an: New Words of
Warning to a Prosperous Age 盛世新危言 ,” Chinese Heritage Quarterly, no. 26, June 2011,
http://chinaheritagenewsletter.anu.edu.au/features.php?searchterm=026_yanan.inc&issue=026
(consulted on 10 May 2012). For an early book devoted in part to these issues, see Shades of
Mao: The posthumous career of the Great Leader (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1996, 321 pages);
and for a work that notes the abiding legacies of the Maoist era during the 1980s and in particular
during the Protest Movement of 1989, see the narration of The Gate of Heavenly Peace (Boston,
1995) at www.tsquare.tv, of which I was the principal author (consulted on 10 May 2012). 
3. I would suggest a simple division of Maoism into: a pre-1949 form; that of High State Maoism
when the complex body of thinking, policies, and personality cult held sway in China from 1949
until the end of 1978 (and the launching of the reform era); the 1978-89 decade of contestation;
the 1989-99 decade of recalibration; and the 1999- era in which Maoist and Marxist legacies
have found new champions both inside and outside of Chinese officialdom. Such a schema is but
a crude convenience.
4. See, for example, Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds.), Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Po-
litical Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Asia
Center, 2011.
5. Elizabeth Perry’s new work on the miners of Anyuan offers a particular account of the domesti-
cation of revolution in China. See Elizabeth J. Perry, Anyuan: Mining China’s Revolutionary Tradition,
Berkeley (CA), University of California Press, 2012 (forthcoming).
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this age of revolution we should also be mindful of a longer and overlapping
age of reform, one that to all intents and purposes has enjoyed a longue
durée: from the externally generated and autocratically imposed reforms,
or self-strengthening of the Tongzhi Restoration dating from 1860, through
to the Open Door and Reform formally initiated by the Chinese Communist
Party in late 1978. 
When discussing China’s historical legacy we are usually invited by the
Chinese party-state to accept a certain narrative arc and its particular offi-
cial articulation. (6) It is the story not of Chinese greatness as much as the
connected tale of the decline in power, economic might, and unity of the
Chinese world from the eighteenth century, through the century of humil-
iation (roughly 1840-1949) and the birth of a New China and the two acts
of liberation (1949 and 1978). This culminates in the present with the “great
renaissance of the Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzude weida fuxing 中华
民族的伟大复兴) formally announced by Party General Secretary Jiang
Zemin a decade ago and repeatedly affirmed by General Secretary Hu Jintao
on the occasion of the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the People’s
Republic as well as when he marked the centenary of the 1911 Xinhai Rev-
olution on 9 October 2011. (7) It is in this connected narrative that “The
China Story” (Zhongguode gushi 中国的故事), itself a relatively recent con-
ceit, has been concocted. (8) It is a story that has been interwoven intimately
with the grand romantic narrative of communism. This narrative speaks to
the history of the Party in the context of national revolution and independ-
ence; it cleaves to Mao Zedong (and a panoply of lesser leaders) as well as
many aspects of his career, thought, and politics. Although the Communist
Party-centric version of that narrative may appear to many to be politically
bankrupt in all but name, the appeal of an overarching existential rationale
for the power-holders, and indeed for people of various backgrounds who
have been immersed in the carefully modulated party-state account of
China’s past, remains undiminished.
One of the most abiding legacies of the red era, and one particularly at-
tractive for its advocates regardless of their present political persuasion, is
the paradigm of the Cold War. In the eternal present of Cold War attitudes
and rhetoric the panoply of devices carefully cultivated during the era of
class struggle is easily translated into the tensions between the People’s Re-
public of China and its neighbours as well as other developed nations today.
The rhetorical landscape so comfortably traversed by the party-state and
those in its thrall (from state think tank apparatchiki and a swarm of left-
leaning academics to semi-independent media writers) also feeds the
mimetic grandstanding of the other side in any given stoush.
Since 2009, rhetorical clashes of this kind have revolved around such areas
as: climate change, US arms sales to Taiwan, the valuation of the Renminbi,
Internet freedom, territorial issues in the South China Sea, and ongoing dis-
turbances in Tibet and Xinjiang. (9) These issues – and here I am concerned
with Chinese rhetoric, not the substantive matters involving different na-
tional and economic interests – the default position of the Chinese party-
state remains that of the early Maoist days, when conspiracy theories, class
struggle, and overblown rhetorical grandstanding formed the backdrop to
any official stance. (10) Of course, any discussion of rhetorical opposition can-
not detract from real clashes of national interests, worldviews, or political
and economic systems.
The Maoist past continues to shape perceptions and discursive practices
in the cultural-linguistic realm of China today. Elsewhere, I have noted that
the language of “totalitarianism” (that is holistic or totalising systems in
which the party-state – in particular its leaders and theorists – attempts to
dominate and determine ideological visions and linguistic practices, as well
as social, political, and economic policy) as it evolved over many years came
to operate according to rules and an internal logic that aid and abet a
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6. See, for example, William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation, New York, Oxford University
Press, 2009.
7. See, for example, such analyses as: “‘Sange daibiao’ yu Zhonghua minzu weidade fuxing,” 8 Feb-
ruary 2002, www.bjqx.org.cn/qxweb/n807c5.aspx (consulted on 11 May 2012); and “Zhengque
lijie Zhonghua minzude weida fuxing,” 27 January 2007, www.bjqx.org.cn/qxweb/n7499c5.aspx
(consulted on 11 May 2012). Hu Jintao used the expression “Chinese national revival” (Zhonghua
minzu fuxing) 23 times during his 9 October 2011 Xinhai speech. See “Hu Jintao 23 ci ti Zhonghua
minzu fuxing, minzu fuxing bixu zhaodao zhengque daolu,” in Nanfang ribao, 10 October 2011,
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/15842000.html (consulted on 11 May 2012). For a recent
comment on various aspects of this narrative as generated in China and internationally, see William
A. Callahan, “Sino-speak: Chinese Exceptionalism and the Politics of History,” The Journal of Asian
Studies, vol. 71, no. 1, February 2012, pp. 1-23.
8. For more on this, see my analysis of the Opening Ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, “China’s
Flat Earth: History and 8 August 2008,” The China Quarterly, vol. 197, March 2009, pp. 64-86;
and, my “Telling Chinese Stories” presented at The University of Sydney, 1 May 2012.
9. Although US-based academic audiences will invariably see things through the particular (dare I
say “distorting”?) prism of US-China-specific relations, for those of us in the Antipodes the various
kerfuffles in 2009 involving the Sino-Australian relationship over the aluminium corporation of
China Chinalco’s investment plans, Stern Hu’s arrest in Shanghai (and March 2010 trial), and the
visit of the Uyghur activist Rebiya Kadeer to Melbourne, are more salient. For more on this, see
China Story Yearbook 2012: Red Rising, Red Eclipse, Canberra, Australian Centre on China in the
World (ANU), 2012.
10. See, for example, Qiang Zhai, “1959: Preventing Peaceful Evolution,” China Heritage Quarterly,
no. 18, June 2009, www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php?searchterm=018_1959prevent-
ingpeace.inc&issue=018 (consulted on 11 May 2012); and, my essay “The Harmonious Evolution
of Information in China,” China Heritage Quarterly, no. 21, March 2010, www.chinaheritagequar-
terly.org/articles.php?searchterm=021_peacefulevolution.inc&issue=021 (consulted on 11 May
2012).
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thought process conducive to its continued sway. (11) In the past this attempt
at Gleichschaltung, that is the coordination or “intermeshing” of the inner
and outer individual, as well as the various arms and practices of gover-
nance, was part of the construction of the socialist enterprise and the “new
socialist man.” Today, the situation is far more complex as elements of so-
cialism are melded with neo-liberalism, and the New China Newspeak of
the party-state has been injected with the discursive practices of global
managerialism. (12)
In the decades of its ascendancy, as well in the subsequent long years of
tenacious reform, the totalitarian in China has exhibited an intriguing ver-
satility, one whereby it has continued to “commodify” or “domesticate” to
its particular ends culture, ideas, and even oppositionist forces. (13)
We may well ask, however, has revolutionary politics, or even the potency
of left-leaning ideas, been entirely evacuated from this story today? Has
the neo-liberal turn of Chinese statist politics of recent decades created less
a story of revolutionary potential (or even leftist resistance) and more one
that offers an account of self-interest constructed around a concocted “Chi-
nese race,” an account the main concern of which is a nationalistic rise on
the world stage? Or, do the various red legacies that date from the Repub-
lican era (be they communist, socialist, or social-democratic) contribute
something more than a turn of phrase, a glossy overlay of Party culture, and
a coherent (and now often glib) account of national decline and revival to
China’s political discourse and national mission? If so, then how does the
leftist legacy distinguish itself from a failed Maoism? Or is Maoism and its
panoply of language and practices the only viable source of resistance be-
sides the discourses of universalism, as well as economic and human rights
in China today?
In discussing the past it is of vital importance to appreciate motivating
ideas and ideals; by the same token we should be wary of those who would
separate for their convenience theory from historical reality (even though
the details of that reality themselves may be contested). Some writers on
contemporary China and its tangle of traditions find it enticing to engage
in what could be called a “strategic disaggregation” of the ideological/ the-
oretical from the historical/ lived. Without doubt, it is important for
thoughtful academics to challenge the crude narratives related to modern
Chinese history, be they authored by the Chinese party-state, by the inter-
national media, or indeed by a Cold War-inflected academic world. However,
in the process equally ham-fisted attempts to “recuperate” elements of
Maoism or Chinese-inflected Marxism-Leninism in the context of the one-
party state can too easily allow people to champion abstract ideas clear of
the bloody and tragic realities of the past. Similarly, to privilege Maoism
while overlooking the other leftist traditions, the “paths not taken” due to
the hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party, is to view the past with the
same kind of ideological bias of which pro-Maoist writers accuse their liberal
and neo-liberal opponents. 
Below, in the first instance, I touch briefly on recent events and their back-
ground before going on to consider historical narrative, cultural phenomena,
and intellectual careerism.
A red star falls over China: Lessons from Chongqing
The red patrimony – and indeed it is mostly the construction of male
thinkers, activists, and power-holders – contains within it a whole range of
intellectual artefacts from various points in China’s revolutionary theory
and practice. The generation of “enemies” (pace Carl Schmitt and his con-
temporary acolytes) and the atmospherics of plots and conspiracies are still
central to the way that the Chinese Communist Party channels and responds
to the spectres of the past. Although this formerly underground political
party has recast itself as a legitimate government (zhizhengdang 执政党)
with all the paraphernalia of state power, to this day its internal protocols
and behaviour recall all too frequently its long history as a covert, highly
secretive, and faction-ridden organisation. Even under Mao, some commen-
tators called China a “mafia-state.” This aspect of the party-state was
thrown into sharp relief in February 2012 when the former deputy mayor
of Chongqing, Wang Lijun 王立军, a man famed for a time for having led
the attack on that city’s own “mafias,” was ordered to undergo a eu-
phemistically termed “extended period of therapeutic rest” (xiujiashi zhiliao
休假式治疗) following his appearance at, and subsequent disappearance
from, the US consulate in Chengdu, Sichuan Province (subsequently, “treat-
ment” was revised to become detention and investigation). The next month,
on 15 March, his erstwhile local Party leader, Bo Xilai 薄熙来, was dismissed
from his various positions and put under investigation.
On 14 March 2012, a day before the sensational news of Bo Xilai’s fall
was announced, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, speaking at what would
be his last press conference as the head of China’s government, twice re-
ferred to the 1981 Communist Party decision on “certain historical ques-
tions.” (14) That document is one of key importance for an understanding of
post-Mao Chinese politics; it also provides the ideological rationale for
China’s post-1978 economic reforms. In that carefully worded text, the
socio-economic policies that had underpinned the Mao era, including the
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, were formally negated. In
March 2012, Wen referred to the 1981 decision in the following way:
I want to say a few words at this point, since the founding of the
People’s Republic China, under the leadership of the Party and the
government, our country’s modernisation drive has made great
achievements. Yet at the same time, we’ve also taken detours and
have learnt hard lessons. Since the Third Plenum of the 11th CPC
Central Committee [in December 1978], in particular since the cen-
tral authorities took the decision on the correct handling of relevant
historical issues, we have established the line of thinking and that
we should free our minds and seek truth from facts and we have for-
mulated the basic guidelines of our Party. In particular, we’ve taken
the major decision of conducting reform and opening up in China, a
decision that’s crucial for China’s future and destiny.
What has happened shows that any practice that we take must be
based on the experience and lessons we’ve gained from history and
it must serve the people’s interests. The practice that we take must
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11. See Michael Schoenhals, Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies, Berkeley (CA),
Institute of East Asian Studies (University of California), China Research Monograph, 1992; and,
Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China,
Boulder (CO), Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.
12. For an extended essay on New China Newspeak, see the entry in the China Heritage Glossary,
China Heritage Quarterly, no. 29, March 2012, www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/glossary.php?
searchterm=029_xinhua.inc&issue=029 (consulted on 15 May 2012).
13. This is the particular focus of my 1999 book In the Red: On contemporary Chinese culture, New
York, Columbia University Press.
14. “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party Since the Founding of the People’s
Republic of China (Adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China on 27 June 1981),” available online at: www.marxists.org/subject/
china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm (consulted on 11 May 2012).
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be able to stand the test of history and I believe the people fully
recognise this point and I have full confidence in our future. (15)
Over a year before Bo Xilai was put under investigation for breaching Party
discipline, there were overt signs that ideological contestation and a con-
comitant power struggle were well underway. Since the last major public
power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party over two decades ago
in 1989, it has become an accepted view of China’s particular brand of one-
party consensual authoritarianism that prior to any leadership change
jostling for position within the top echelon of the hierarchy takes a number
of forms. While it is all but impossible to track effectively the backroom
dealings, the power plays, and the political feints involved in what is a
byzantine process, the media still provide some indication of the nature of
intra-party tussles. Zhongnanhai-ology, however, remains at best an imag-
inative art. Nonetheless, given the volubility of various critics of the Party
since 2009, by early 2011 observers were wondering what had happened
to the usually outspoken organs of Party Central.
In late May 2011, the Party did finally make itself heard over the din of
fraught contestation. In an opinion piece published by the Central Discipli-
nary Commission on 25 May, Party members were warned to obey “political
discipline” and to cease henceforth from offering unsolicited and wayward
views on China’s political future. It declared that a “profound political strug-
gle” currently confronted the Party; it was time to silence idle speculation
and furthermore it was necessary to reiterate Party General Secretary Hu
Jintao’s “Six Absolute Interdictions” (liuge juebu yunxu 六个决不允许) for
Party members – basically, follow the Party line and do not engage in public
discussions or offer personal opinions; do not fabricate or spread political
gossip; and do not leak state secrets or participate in illegal organisations. (16)
The document noted that there were those who were “pursuing their own
agendas in regard to Party policy and requirements, all the while making a
show of being in step with the Party; others have been taken in by various sto-
ries they pick up, indulge in idle speculation and generate ‘political rumours’.”
Furthermore, it warned that dissenting Party voices were leading to (disruptive)
non-Party and international speculation about the Communist Party’s leader-
ship and its future. In other words, it could damage the national economy. In
2011-12, the issues of the Maoist legacy were not matters merely of academic
interest; they directly impinged on the party-state’s succession plans and more
broadly on contending agendas for China’s future direction both at home and
internationally. One particular area of contention related to how the Maoist
past could, and indeed should, contribute to China’s future.
Metaphors of history: Rumours and factions
More broadly, the events of Chongqing reveal a distinct political culture
with its own specific history, one that reaches back into the High-Maoist,
Republican, and imperial eras. It is significant that Bo Xilai’s own promotion
of red culture included “red reading” that encouraged officials and citizens
to “read the classics” covering thinkers and works from all of these periods.
As rumours circulated – and were energetically denied or dismissed by the
authorities – one is reminded of previous episodes in Communist Party his-
tory during which rumour-mongering, talk of corruption, and the crushing
of dissent have been rife. Of course, there is the earliest story related to the
writer Wang Shiwei. A critic of Party privilege in the Yan’an period during
the early 1940s, he was branded a Trotskyite and traitor. Eventually he was
beheaded. (17)
Political rumours (zhengzhi yaoyan 政治谣言) featured during various cru-
cial periods in the People’s Republic as well, in particular during the Maoist
years. Given the Party’s control over the media and the secretive nature of
its political processes, gossip and rumours have long been the stuff of in-
formal comment on the issues of the day, and the means by which alterna-
tive accounts of Party rule circulate. For example, after the founding of the
People’s Republic, when Mao called on intellectuals and others to help the
Party “rectify its work style” in light of criticisms of Party rule in the Eastern
Bloc in 1956, many took advantage of the invitation to speak out against
the secretive privileges and power of Party cadres. They, too, were silenced.
In 1966, when Red Guard rebels were first allowed to attack the Party, they
identified privilege, corruption, and abuse of power as one of the greatest
enemies to the revolution. During this period of Party civil war it was word
of mouth and big-character posters that were the common medium em-
ployed by individuals and groups to speculate and denounce. Again, around
the time of Lin Biao’s fall in 1971, there was a campaign against political
hearsay involving Jiang Qing and her famous interviews with Roxanne Witke.
Following Deng Xiaoping’s fall in April 1976, the “strange talk and odd ideas”
(qitan guailun 奇谈怪论) of July to September 1975 were denounced by
the official media. Then, shortly after Mao’s death, when there was a period
of relatively free criticism of the purged Party leaders blamed for the may-
hem of the Cultural Revolution, privilege and corruption were identified once
more as the greatest threat. Another period of political speculation followed
shortly thereafter at the time of the Xidan Democracy Wall in 1978-79, and
again in 1988-89 leading up to 4 June, rumours and speculation were rife.
During the 1989 nation-wide protests, some protesters released a detailed
account of the connection between Party bureaucrats, their children, and
the new business ventures that had sprung up during the early stages of re-
form. (One of the Party leaders named and blamed for the corrupt nexus
between Party power, private enterprise, and global capital was Zhao Ziyang,
later ousted as Party General Secretary.) Even from this cursory sketch we
notice that intensified political gossip and official attempts to silence it
have been the hallmarks of ruptures in Chinese life for over six decades.
Thus, it was no surprise that, shortly following the announcement of disci-
plinary and legal investigations into Bo Xilai and his wife, Gu Kailai, in April
2012, the authorities announced a new push to quell political rumour-mon-
gering. On 16 April, the People’s Daily denied rumours of a coup and that
military vehicles had been deployed in the capital; (18) in the days that fol-
lowed, a series of denials and articles decrying the malign influence of ru-
mour-mongering were published both in the national and local media. (19)
The political culture of historical inference, or to use a formulation familiar
from the period of High Maoism, “to use the past to satirise the present”
(jiegu fengjin 借古讽今) or at least to use the past to reflect on the present
32 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 2 / 2
15. Reuters, "China Premier Wen Jiabao's comments at NPC press conference," www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/2012/03/14/china-npc-highlights-idUSL4E8EE11K20120314 (consulted on 11 May 2012).
16. See “Jianjue weihu dangde zhengzhi jilü,” http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/14727703.html (con-
sulted on 11 May 2012); and the independent commentary, www.chinese.rfi.fr/中国/20110525-
中纪委警告中共党员莫对重大政治问题”说三道四” (consulted on 11 May 2012).
17. See Dai Qing, “Wang Shiwei and ‘Wild Lilies’” (Wang Shiweiyu “Yebaihehua”), the full text on
www.cup-authors.com/daiqing/article.php?id=81 (consulted on 11 May 2012); and, Dai Qing,
Wang Shiwei and “Wild Lilies”: Rectification and purges in the Chinese Communist Party, 1942-
1944, edited by David E. Apter and Timothy Cheek, translated by Nancy Liu and Lawrence R. Sul-
livan, documents compiled by Song Jinshou, Armonk (NY), M.E. Sharpe, 1994.
18. See “‘Junche jinjing’ yaoyan jiyi yingxiang wending,” Renmin ribao, 16 April 2012,
http://news.cn.yahoo.com/ypen/20120416/989582.html (consulted on 11 May 2012).
19. See for example, Zhang He, “‘Yao renqing wangluo yaoyande shehui weihai’,” Renmin ribao, 16 April
2012, http://news.qq.com/a/20120416/000160.htm (consulted on 11 May 2012), and so on.
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(yujin 喻今), is still familiar not only to writers who grew up in the days of
Maoism and its official disavowal (1978-1980s), but also to writers today.
One could argue that historical metaphors are part of the fabric of Chinese
social and cultural life that far predate the Mao era. (20) There is no doubt
that finding esoteric meanings, clues to contemporary politics, messages
for the masses, and so on in plays, novels, and movies was a central feature
of Maoist-era politics and cultural life. During the post-Cultural Revolution
disavowal of the politics of the purge and mass campaigns, this use of his-
tory and culture was decried as being a “historiography by [political] infer-
ence” (yingshe shixue 影射史学).
Despite this, in the penumbra of politics, a popular market for revelations
about the inner workings of power continues to this day, something evident
most recently in the wave of microblog comments on the Chinese Internet
surrounding Bo Xilai, as well as his immediate and extended family.
Rumours have a venerable history in modern China. At the end of the Qing
dynasty, for example, rumours about court politics abounded. They filled
accounts known as “wild” or “untamed histories” (yeshi 野史); they provided
an alternative to the formal records of the time. While the new Republican
government would appoint a bureau to oversee a writing of a formal Qing
history (a controversial and flawed enterprise that produced a Draft History
of the Qing 清史稿), unofficial or “wild histories” proliferated. As the histo-
rian Harold Kahn has noted:
Official history adjusted the record to suit the needs of the court;
unofficial history embroidered it to meet the tastes of a broader, less
discriminating public. And it is this embroidered record which has
formed the stable of much of China’s popular historical thought. (21)
Shortly following the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, scabrous
revelations about the inner workings of the defunct imperial court, as well
as speculation regarding some of the most notorious incidents in the Qing
dynasty, became the stuff of popular history writing and literature. There
were, for example, stories about the rumoured marriage between the em-
press dowager Xiaozhuang 孝庄 ( d. 1688) and her brother-in-law Dorgon
多尔衮; details of the imperial prince Yinzhen’s 胤祯 usurpation of the throne
following the death of his father the Kangxi 康熙 emperor; hearsay to do
with the Yongzheng 雍正 emperor’s sudden demise; discussions about the
questionable relationship between the minister Hešen 和珅 and the Qian-
long 乾隆 emperor; details related to the invasion of the Forbidden City dur-
ing the Jiaqing 嘉庆 reign; lascivious accounts of the addictions (and
afflictions) of the youthful Tongzhi 同治 emperor in the 1870s; talk about
what went on between the Empress Dowager and the eunuch Li Lianying
李莲英; dark mutterings surrounding the mysterious demise of the Guangxu
光绪 emperor (he predeceased the Empress Dowager by a day); and so on
and so forth. What were illicit unofficial accounts in the past provided fodder
for readers who had access to a booming publishing market, and with due
consideration of the anti-Qing sentiment of the early Republic were anxious
to see fun made of the defunct imperial masters while at the same time
indulging in patriotic entertainment.
After 1949, the modern tradition of employing fiction or unofficial histo-
ries to reveal and speculate on the inner workings of China’s rulers (not only
dynastic, but also Republican, and eventually communist) continued to
flourish, but in Hong Kong. That is until political relaxation, and a commer-
cial publishing boom, transformed the media landscape in both China and
Taiwan from the late 1970s. It is also perhaps hardly a coincidence that the
first, albeit unsuccessful, cultural campaign of Maoist China was also one
involved with historical verdicts and revelations of inner-court wrangling.
This was the criticism that Mao Zedong launched shortly after the founding
of the People’s Republic of the Hong Kong film The Secret History of the
Qing Court (Qinggong mishi 清宫秘史, 1948). (22)
The very culture of Emperors, Kings, Ministers, and Generals (di wang jiang
xiang 帝王将相), as well as that of Talented Scholars and Beauties (caizi
jiaren 才子佳人) collectively excoriated in the early years of the People’s
Republic and then actively denounced as part of the prelude to the Cultural
Revolution era has, since the 1980s, become part of the mainstream once
more. The production of Chinese historical costume dramas had previously
been the province of TV and film-makers in Hong Kong and Taiwan. It was
in the 1990s, however, as a result of voracious TV audiences and a political
environment that was more willing to accept the previously excoriated “feu-
dal” past, that numerous new accounts of the imperial era appeared in the
form of “fanciful accounts” (xishuo 戏说) of emperors and empresses vari-
ously in their youth, at the height of their powers, and in their dotage. One
of the first of these was the 1991 Taiwan-mainland coproduction A Fanciful
Account of Qianlong (Xishuo Qianlong 戏说乾隆), a 41-part TV series about
the Qianlong emperor’s Tours of the South, based on a fictional account of
the ruler’s supposed exploits during three of his provincial progresses. (23)
The “fanciful account” genre would eventually become a version of historical
narrative characterised by semi- or completely farcical recountings of his-
torical incidents, figures, or even past fictions for the sake of popular enter-
tainment. Films and TV shows in this semi-parodic style would proliferate.
The recapturing of the past through such humorous and often lubricious
fictions was liberating, and it has appeared to challenge the historical
schema formalised during the early decades of the People’s Republic. How-
ever, the actual story may be somewhat more complex. The rehabilitation
of traditional history and storytelling, in particular in the form of popular
history, since the advent of policies to promote “spiritual civilisation” first
raised in 1979 and then pursued from the mid 1980s, serves well the polit-
ical status quo. This is because the revival of the past is still, for the most
part, expected to conform to the contours of national history as delineated
in the Maoist-era temporal landscape. This timescape was itself developed
over many decades on the basis of debates about Chinese history, periodi-
sation, economic development, and social change, from the time of the
New Culture Movement (roughly 1917-27). (24) Popular accounts of the im-
perial past aided the Party’s overarching efforts to reintegrate the history
of dynastic China, and the country’s greatness, into the modern record and
the broad narrative of national revival discussed earlier.
The popular fictionalisation of history, however, has hardly been limited
to the dynastic past, nor has it simply accorded with official dictates. Film
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and fiction accounts of both Republican and Communist Party history accord
with guidelines set down by Party historians and propagandists. This policing
of the past has been particularly prevalent since an incident in 2003 involving
the multi-episode TV series, Towards a Republic 走向共和. Produced to mark
the 1911 Xinhai Revolution and the founding of the Republic of China, the
series was, at first glance, a relative standard costume drama, mixing as it
did elements of theatricality with serious history. The writers of Towards a
Republic, who included liberal Qing historians, offered a view of the 1911
Revolution that not only challenged the Party’s interpretation of the past
but also served as an indictment of its present autocratic behaviour.
The 60-part series had a finale in which the father of the nation, Sun Yat-sen,
appears to be addressing the viewing audience directly. As he explains the sym-
bolism of what we know as the Mao suit (Zhongshanzhuang or “Sun Yat-sen
jacket” in Chinese), Sun describes each of the buttons and pockets of the gar-
ment as representing parts of his political program – economic progress, de-
mocratisation, and the separation of powers. He then addresses the viewer:
I have thought long and deep in recent times: how is it that so many
feudalistic and autocratic things have appeared time and again in
our new Republic? If this is not dealt with, it is inevitable that the
autocracy will reign once more; the Republic will forever be but a mi-
rage.
The idea of a Republic is based on equality, freedom, and the love of
humanity. But over the past six years we have been witness to how
government bureaucrats at every level have treated the law like dirt;
how the people have been enslaved.
A Republic should be a place of freedom; freedom is the heaven-
given right of the people.
But over these six years we have witnessed the power-holders en-
joying freedom. The more power you have the more freedom you
enjoy; the less power you have the more circumscribed your freedom.
The people have no power, so they have no freedom…
The Republic should be governed by the rule of law, but over the past
six years we have seen administrative power used repeatedly to in-
terfere with the operation of the law. If you are not obedient I’ll buy
you off; if you fail to comply I will arrest you, or have you killed. Law-
makers have been prostituted by the power-holders, and they have
their way at will… (25)
When the series was rebroadcast this material had been removed. As a
result of the controversy surrounding Towards a Republic, in 2004 the State
Administration of Radio, Film, and Television established a new oversight
group that would now police the production and censoring of all materials
related not only to the revolution but to history overall. (26) It was this same
government group that in early 2011, as rumours and power-play swelled
in Beijing and elsewhere, placed a ban on films and TV shows that specu-
lated about either the past or the future. As political rumour-mongering un-
settled Party equanimity, the possibility that people could contemplate
alternative scenarios for China also seemed unsettling. In particular, shows
featuring time travel (known as chuanyueju 穿越剧) were interdicted as
they “lack positive thoughts and meaning” (27) and go “against Chinese her-
itage.” (28)
As issues related to democracy and authoritarianism are debated today,
we can also detect a nostalgia for a past in which a different kind of future
was imagined, as opposed to a present in which the past is constantly being
marshalled, trimmed, and massaged to legitimate the Party. As film and TV
accounts of the past proliferated through the 1990s and into the new mil-
lennium, a new category of revived culture appeared, that of the “red clas-
sic” (hongse jingdian 红色经典). First promoted as part of the patriotic
education campaign instituted following the events of 1989 to teach both
students and wider audiences about the history of the revolution and the
dangers that had, and that continued, to beset it, “red classics,” or old prop-
aganda movies, were rebroadcast nationwide. In more recent years as media
offerings have proliferated, a new genre of culture has developed under the
old rubric of the “red classic.” These include not only films and TV shows,
but also songs, novels, poems, and art works. Collectively they form a nar-
rative of revolution that has been stripped of revolutionary politics but
which retains a highly romantic depiction of the past and its achievements
in which the glories of the Party are intertwined with accounts of heroism,
love, sacrifice, and noble aspiration.
Until the appearance of the “sing red” campaign championed by
Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai and his supporters in 2009, the “red clas-
sic” genre was easily derided as being of marginal interest and importance
in understanding contemporary China and its worldview. I would ask rather
as series of questions:
Is the corpus of “red classic” works merely fodder for the avaricious maw
of a media market that must work with the material available, and as such
has little greater significance?
Or is it part of the very skein of modern mainland Chinese culture that
through repetition and adaptation has normalised the historical narrative of
the modern party-state? And, if that is the case (even partially),
Does the de-politicised narrative of the revolution not cannily employ
petit-bourgeois sentimentality as a means to disallow audiences from imag-
ining significant social change? (29)
Or is there some greater, more “progressive,” potential in the repetition
of familiar cultural “classics,” so much so that in fact these works re-famil-
iarise audiences with the revolution, its values, and rhetoric, so that concepts
of social justice, fairness, and freedom that were so important during the
long years of struggle before 1949 find a new lease on life?
Or should these concerns be swept aside as it is all just commercialised
fun and a story about canny media players cynically taking advantage of
party-state dictates to promote and produce uncontroversial material?
Is this yet another chapter in the degradation of the sublime (chonggao
崇高) that the novelist and former Minister of Culture Wang Meng 王蒙 de-
cried in the 1990s?
Or, perhaps, can we detect in the re-makings, spoofs, and recountings of
High Maoist policies, cultural styles, and forms ways in which the impotent,
powerless, and dispossessed can express opposition to the eternalising pre-
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sumption of a party-state, one that maintains its dominion over the main-
stream historical narrative, national identity, and real political power?
Is this “resistance within” also not part of the red legacy – the opposition
to the Party’s theory-led monopoly on discourse, ideas, and everyday poli-
tics?
Waving the red flag to oppose the red flag: Red heirs
and intellectuals
History, distorted accounts of the past, and the power of metaphor have
all played a role in the unfolding of recent Chinese political dramas, just as
they have engaged with the Maoist legacy in complex ways.
In April 1984, a group of students who had graduated from elite Beijing mid-
dle schools created an informal association to celebrate their camaraderie
and their origins. They called themselves the Fellowship of the Children of
New China (Xinhua Ernü Lianyihui 新华儿女联谊会). (30) At the time of the
centenary of Mao Zedong’s birth in 1993, the group renamed itself the Beijing
Children of Yan’an Classmates Fellowship (Beijing Yan’an Ernü 
Xiaoyou Lianyihui 北京延安儿女校友联谊会). Its members were the descen-
dants of men and women who had lived and worked in the Yan’an Communist
base in Shaanxi Province from the 1930s to the 1940s, as well as the progeny
of the Party who were born and educated in Yan’an. From 1998, the group
held annual gatherings to coincide with the Spring Festival (Chinese New
Year), as well as a range of other events organised around choral and dancing
groups, Taijiquan classes, and painting and calligraphy activities. In 2001, they
shortened their name to the Beijing Children of Yan’an Fellowship.
From 2002, the Children of Yan’an was led by Hu Muying 胡木英, daughter
of Hu Qiaomu 胡乔木, a Party wordsmith par excellence and Mao Zedong’s
one-time political secretary. In 2008, the fellowship expanded its member-
ship to include people with no specific link to the old Communist base and
its revolutionary éclat. With a core membership of some 100 people, the
Children of Yan’an not only boasted the leadership of Hu Muying, but also
the key participation of Li Min 李敏 (Mao Zedong’s oldest daughter), Zhou
Bingde 周秉德 (Zhou Enlai’s niece), Ren Yuanfang 任远芳 (Party elder Ren
Bishi’s 任弼时 daughter), Lu Jianjian 陆健健 (former Party propaganda chief
Lu Dingyi’s 陆定一 son) and Chen Haosu 陈昊苏 (son of Chen Yi 陈毅, the
pre-Cultural Revolution Mayor of Shanghai and later Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs). On 13 February 2011, the group held their annual Chinese New Year
gathering in the auditorium of the 1 August Film Studio, an organisation
under the direct aegis of the People’s Liberation Army.
On that occasion, apart from the Children of Yan’an, a range of other inter-
ested groups, or what were dubbed “revolutionary mass organisations,” were
also present. (31) During the speech-ifying that day these various attendees were
collectively represented by Chen Haosu, himself a former film and TV bureau-
crat with a noble Party lineage that we have noted above. The Children of
Yan’an Fellowship itself was represented by Hu Muying and her deputy, Zhang
Ya’nan 张亚南, formerly the Political Commissar of the PLA Logistics Depart-
ment and previously secretary to Wei Guoqing 韦国清, a Cultural Revolution-
era vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress.
Following a series of platitudinous remarks and a brief recounting of the long
years of struggle that their revolutionary forebears had gone through to found
New China (an account that, not surprisingly, glossed over the bloody horrors
of the first three decades of Party rule from 1949 to 1978), Hu Muying said:
The new explorations made possible by Reform and the Open Door
policies have, over the past three decades, resulted in remarkable eco-
nomic results. At the same time, ideological confusion has reigned and
the country has been awash in intellectual currents that negate Mao
Zedong Thought and socialism. Corruption and the disparity between
the wealthy and the poor are of increasingly serious concern; latent
social contradictions are becoming more extreme.
We absolutely reject the label of “Princelings” (Taizi Dang 太子党),
nor are we “Second-generation Bureaucrats” (Guan Erdai 官二代). We
are the Red Successors, the Revolutionary Progeny, and as such we
cannot but be concerned about the fate of our Party, our Nation, and
our People. We can no longer ignore the present crisis of the Party. (32)
Hu went on to say that through the activities of study groups, lecture se-
ries, and symposia the Children of Yan’an had formulated a document that,
following broad-based consultation, would be presented to Party Central.
The document was entitled “Our Suggestions for the Eighteenth Party Con-
gress” (Women dui Shiba Da de jianyi 我们对十八大的建议). (33) “We can-
not,” Hu continued:
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be satisfied merely with reminiscences nor can we wallow in nostal-
gia for the glories of the sufferings of our parents’ generation. We
must carry on in their heroic spirit, contemplate and forge ahead by
asking ever-new questions that respond to the new situations with
which we are confronted. We must attempt to address these ques-
tions and contribute to the healthy growth of our Party and help pre-
vent our People once more from eating the bitterness of the
capitalist past.
For his part, Zhang Ya’nan declared that China’s Communist Party, the Com-
munist cause, and Marxism-Leninism itself were being directly challenged and
indeed disparaged by the enemies of the revolutionary founding fathers. In
particular, he despaired of the de-Maoification that continued to unfold in
China. He reminded his audience that “Chairman Mao bequeathed us four
things: one piece of software and three pieces of hardware. The hardware is
the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, and the
People’s Republic of China. The software is Mao Zedong Thought.” Zhang went
on to praise the Red Culture campaign launched by Bo Xilai in Chongqing in
2008, the stance of Major-General Luo Yuan 罗援, and the writings of Zhang
Tieshan 张铁山. He then commended to his audience the document formu-
lated for the Party’s late-2012 Eighteenth Congress. He declared that it was
a manifesto that gave voice to their wish “to love the Party, protect the flag,
and revitalise the as-yet-unfinished enterprise of our revolutionary forebears.”
He also suggested that the Children of Yan’an should invite activists who were
involved in the Mao Zedong Banner website 毛泽东旗帜网 and the Workers’
Network 工人网 to their next Spring Festival gathering in January 2012. (34)
The Children of Yan’an site made no mention of the 2012 Spring Festival,
which, in the event, was a low-key affair. After all, as we have noted above,
by then the “atmospherics” of Chinese politics had undergone a dramatic
transformation. Not long after Spring Festival, Wang Lijun had made his dra-
matic visit to the American Consulate in Chengdu. By mid-March, around
the time of Bo Xilai’s fall, key leftist or revivalist-Maoist sites such as Utopia,
Mao Zedong Banner (Mao Flag), and Red China had been suspended by the
authorities; Workers’ Network, however, remained active. (35) One could sum-
marise the views of this informal comradely coalition, one that is based both
in China and overseas, in the following terms: China’s party-state system
(from the Party, army, and government bureaucracy, through to the legal
system and academia) has for the most part fallen under the control of
agents who in the long run are working for foreign interests; the mainstream
Chinese elite consists of pro-US agents. In response to the incursions of
global capital, it was necessary to re-nationalise all assets and abolish private
enterprise and the non-state private market, as well as to reinstitute central
planning. By and large, these groups reaffirm the importance of class analysis
and class struggle, as in the nation’s political life, some declare, it was once
more necessary to obliterate “bourgeois elements taking the capitalist road”
in all areas of government. Among other things, some called for a reform of
China’s legal system so that the death penalty could be extended to intel-
lectual “traitors.” They obliged the authorities by compiling a list of writers,
editors, and intellectuals who would be candidates for elimination. (36)
With their gaze fixed more on the past than the present, the drafters of
“Our Suggestions for the Eighteenth Party Congress” reaffirmed the primacy
of what is known as the “mass line” (qunzhong luxian 群众路线). First artic-
ulated by Mao as early as 1929, the mass line is regarded as being one of
the foundations of Mao Zedong Thought. It calls for the Party to rely un-
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Lin Biao’s demise in September 1971 was actually composed in 1966.
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‘The place where the red songs started being sung’—Xiayun
Ling, Hebei 河北省霞云岭. 
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waveringly on the masses (a vague and ill-defined group at the best of
times), to put faith in them, arouse them, go among them, honestly learn
from them, and serve them.
The Children of Yan’an declared that their reform proposals were a practical
realisation of the long-standing principle of the mass line, one that was en-
shrined in the Party’s Constitution and which had in the past ensured the
Party’s successes. Moreover, they declared that Party leaders could ill afford
to use social and political stability as an excuse for further delays to the sub-
stantive reform of China’s political system. The Children of Yan’an declared
that new political talent could be found among the masses, in particular
among the enthusiastic Party faithful. They claimed, for instance, that the
Red Song movement that originated in Chongqing, and which later spread
nationwide, had seen the appearance of just the kind of enthusiastic younger
Party members who would help ensure the continuation of the Communist
enterprise far into the future. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution in 1966,
Mao Zedong is said to have cautioned that after his demise people would
inevitably “wave the red flag to oppose the red flag” (da hongqi fan hongqi
打红旗反红旗). (37) Now it would appear that the Children of Yan’an were
using their very own red flag to oppose the red flag of economic reform that,
since 1978, had been employed to oppose the red flag of Maoism. This was
one of the underpinnings of Zhang Musheng’s 张木生 re-reading of the
Party’s 1940s program related to “New Democracy” formulated by Mao Ze-
dong-Liu Shaoqi, one that attempted to reconcile Party traditionalists with
the desire for political reforms in keeping with the original ethos of the Mao
years (see also Sebastian Veg’s contribution to this issue). (38)
The revival of a patriotic-oriented Maoist “Red Culture” in Chongqing
under Bo Xilai would for a time be affirmed (or was it really to be co-opted
and marginalised?) by Party leaders, in particular by Politburo Standing
Committee member and head of the party-state legal establishment Zhou
Yongkang 周永康. Around the time that Bo Xilai led a delegation of “red
songsters” to Beijing in mid June 2011, Zhou called for the “forging of three
million idealistic and disciplined souls who are ready to face all dangers with
an unwavering faith.” Of importance in the crucible of the engineers of
human souls was what would now be called the “Five Reds,” that is, “Reading
red books, studying red history, singing red songs, watching red movies, and
taking the red path.” (39)
Not only did the Children of Yan’an formulate a manifesto and agitate for
a form of political reform before the looming change of Party leadership; it
was further said that in their pursuit of a new Maoist-style “mass line” they
had also tried to engender tentative contacts with grass-roots organisations
and petitioner groups in and outside of Beijing. For left-leaning figures in
contemporary China to engage in such practical, and non-hierarchical, pol-
itics was highly significant, especially when considered in contrast to the
academic “New Left” (Xinzuopai 新左派) that had arisen in the 1990s and
2000s.
For over a decade the “New Left” intellectuals – a disparate group that,
like their rhetorical opponents, the “Liberals,” was generally lumped together
– had been variously celebrated and derided. In the late 1990s I spoke about
the “confrontation of caricatures” – that between “new left” and “liberal” –
that was polarising the Chinese intellectual world. (40) It is a topic that the
intellectual historian Xu Jilin 许纪霖 has frequently addressed since that
time. (41) The critics of the New Left claimed that they were primarily “on-
paper generals” (zhishang tan bing 纸上谈兵) who could talk up a storm
(both in China and at the various international academic fora to which they
are frequently invited). They may well profess themselves to being intellec-
tually committed to “recuperating” radical socio-political agendas, critiquing
the capitalist turn in China, and thinking of how best to utilise the “re-
sources” of Marxism-Maoism in the context of the reform era. To their crit-
ics, members of the New Left rarely seemed to demonstrate any practicable
desire to deal with the deprived, marginalised, dispossessed, or repressed in-
dividuals in the society as a whole. Their critics also noted that when issues
of free speech or intellectual freedom came up this usually vociferous group
was generally silent. (42) While elite members of this leftist claque formed
meaty alliances with their global intellectual coevals, on the ground in China
protest, resistance, and opposition to the oppressive practices of party-cap-
italism remained the province of lone activists, NGO groups, liberal intel-
lectuals, lawyers, and the woefully “under-theorised.”
Not only was the revivalism of Chongqing appealing to the Children of
Yan’an, it also attracted a range of left-leaning or New Left intellectuals
both in and outside of China. Bo Xilai and his circle actively cultivated this
disparate group through targeted support for seminars, conferences, and
other generously funded activities. As has been the case of intellectuals at-
tracted moth-like to the flame of power in the past, many of these individ-
uals with their myopic attachment to theory convinced themselves and
others to overlook the evidence in front of them. However, the purblindness
and reticence of members of the New Left is, perhaps, also understandable.
Apart from the usual intellectual qualms about direct social engagement
among those who are more comfortable dealing with academic jousting
and refereed publications in prestigious journals, in China principled activism
does exact a high price. After all, the engaged intellectual soon confronts a
policed authoritarian environment that is infamously punitive. Moreover,
the fate of such prominent nay-sayers as Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 and Ai Weiwei
艾未未 would deter all but the most foolhardy. More disturbing yet is the
cruel abuse of numerous (and often nameless) men and women of con-
science who have been harried, detained, and persecuted by local power-
holders and business interests for often the most spurious reasons. One of
the issues that this paper returns to in various guises is the question of
whether a pro-Maoist rhetoric is the only form of left-leaning critique avail-
able to Chinese thinkers and their international supporters. And, if that is
the case, are critiques of Mao and his bloody legacy always to be deemed
as orientalist, reactionary, or pro-neo-liberal?
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38. Here one is reminded of Wang Shuo’s 1989 novel, No Man’s Land (Qianwan bie ba wo dang ren).
In one scene the protagonist falls in with a leftist underground study group that discusses official
corruption, the need for workers’ rights, and for another revolution. The group is broken up by the
authorities, who declare that they are escapees from a mental asylum. As the later-day Trotskyites
are being dragged away, one shouts out: “What are you going to do when the [real] Communists
come back?” See “The Apotheosis of a Liumang” in my In the Red, op. cit., pp. 91-92.
39. For the Chongqing Daily online report, see “(Chongqing) Zhonghua hongge huilong zhong kaimu”
at: http://news.online.cq.cn/chongqing/2011/06/30/3350893.html (consulted on 11 May 2012).
For those interested in another form of realpolitik, it is perhaps also noteworthy that the “old
friend of China,” Henry Kissinger, attended the rally. Around the time of Bo Xilai’s demise the fate
of his presumed Politburo patron, Zhou Yongkang, was much discussed.
40. Barmé, “The Revolution of Resistance,” in Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (eds.), Chinese Society:
Change, Conflict and Resistance, 3rd ed., London, Routledge, 2010.
41. See, for instance, Xu Jilin, “Jin shinian lai Zhongguo guojiazhuyi sichaozhi pipan,” posted on 6 July
2011 online at: www.21ccom.net/articles/sxpl/sx/article_2011070638713.html (consulted on
11 May 2012).
42. See Cui Weiping’s 崔卫平 phone and email interviews published via Twitter, “Cui Weiping jiu Liu
Xiaobo an fangtan Zhongguo zhishifenzi,” now available at: http://xiangeliushui.blogspot.com.au/
2009/12/cuiwenping-interview-about-liuxiaobo.html (consulted on 15 May 2012), and my com-
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(consulted on 11 May 2012).
43. Andre Aciman, “Arbitrage,” The New Yorker, 10 July 2000, p. 36. This material on arbitrage first ap-
peared in my chapter “Time’s Arrows: Imaginative Pasts and Nostalgic Futures,” in Gloria Davies
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Arbitrage: The global trade in red rhetoric
In discussing red legacies it is necessary to be mindful of the long tradition
whereby left-leaning causes, and discourse, in China (not to mention else-
where) have been entwined with a nationalist or patriotic mission related
to independence, economic growth, and identity politics. In the context of
legacy-creation, the Chinese party-state has inherited and invested heavily
in the Maoist heritage by transposing social class analysis and the Three-
world Theory into the context of contemporary geopolitics. Thus, the Peo-
ple’s Republic, despite its regnant economic strength and international heft,
portrays itself as a proletarian-agrarian developing nation that is primarily
in solidarity with the dispossessed and under-developed nations against the
bourgeois bullies of Euramerica. No matter what elements of truth this self-
description may have, as a rhetorical device and canny transmogrification
of High Maoist categories, it remains a powerful tool in global power poli-
tics, and one area in which the Maoist legacy is particularly vital, and suc-
cessful.
The trans-valuation of Maoist categories into international relations dis-
course is only one of the ways in which the heritage persists into the pres-
ent. Another is the way that rejigged elements of the Maoist canon are
employed to bolster careers, to align research projects, and to guide personal
trajectories. (I would observe that the same holds true even for those who
use Maoist-style patriotism to pursue neo-liberal goals, be they academic
or mercantile.)
In the late 1990s, a disparate group that I think of as the interrogators of
the intelligentsia set themselves apart from the restive throng of their ed-
ucated fellows by claiming a unique purchase on critical inquiry. In their
writings they pursued a project of visualisation towards a “China imaginary”
that would cast all liberal (and I don’t mean neo-liberal) intellectuals as
being of one cloth. As we consider the varied roles of participant observers,
theorising non activists, and academic middlemen (among whose number I
would, of course, include myself), a term current in the world of interna-
tional finance suggests itself. It is called “arbitrage,” that is, “the purchase
of securities in one market for resale in another.” As Andre Aciman com-
ments on the practice in terms of nostalgia and time:
As soon as a profit is made, the cycle starts again, with subsequent
purchases sometimes paid for with unrealized profit drawn from pre-
vious sales. In such transactions, one never really sells a commodity,
much less takes delivery of anything. One merely speculates, and sel-
dom does any of it have anything to do with the real world. Arbi-
trageurs may have seats on not one but two exchanges, the way the
very wealthy have homes in not one but two time zones, or exiles
two homes in the wrong places. One always longs for the other
home, but home, as one learns soon enough, is a place where one
imagines or remembers other homes. (43)
In the context of our own academic pursuits, while one can appreciate di-
vergent agendas for intellectuals who practice their armchair activism in
the relatively oblique language of the academy, an accounting for the past
requires an approach that is mindful not only of frustrated political agendas
and the failure of ideas in practice, but also of the complex human dimen-
sion of ideas in social practice.
In his study and summation of Leszek Kołakowski’s monumental world
Main Currents of Marxism, Tony Judt in particular identifies the abiding at-
traction of that political philosophy: its “blend of Promethean Romantic il-
lusion and uncompromising historical determinism.” (44) Marxism thus, in
this account,
…offered an explanation of how the world works…  It proposed a
way in which the world ought to work…  And it announced incon-
trovertible grounds for believing that things will work that way in
the future, thanks to a set of assertions about historical necessity…
This combination of economic description, moral prescription, and
political prediction proved intensely seductive – and serviceable. (45)
We may well speak of the clever commercialisation of China’s red legacy,
the canny ways in which elements of the Mao era are insinuated into con-
temporary political, social, and cultural discourse. Some writers and com-
mentators are even still diverted by the tired uses of socialist irony in culture
(art, film, essays, blogs, literature, and so on). Others may be beguiled by
the latest in a long line of attempts to recuperate Marx or indeed Mao him-
self from “distortion,” or the academic subprime market devoted to holistic,
globalising interpretations of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin-Mao project. In
terms of activism, one legacy of the revolutionary Mao era – that of direct
political involvement, organised resistance, and struggle, however, seems to
be less appealing. (46)
It is here then, perhaps, that the post-Maoist, Marxist turn in China con-
tributes to our understanding of the categories of the Maoist or red legacy
in the new millennium. Needless to say, much can be made of the glib (and
cynical) commercialisation of red tourism, of the audio-video and digital
wallpaper generated in various cultural forms that quote, revive, and canni-
balise works of high-socialist culture. But has the continuation of one-party
rule in China achieved something particular, not merely the Party as a par-
ticular Chinese phenomenon, and therefore regarded as only being on a na-
tional mission of “prosperity and strength,” but also something else? I would
ask whether the language of the red legacy and its various manifestations
are merely a sly way of packaging Chinese materialism and worldliness, or
whether there might be more at stake and more inherent in it.
While thinkers labour to salvage Marxism from the egregious failures, and
crimes, of Communism (be they of the Soviet or the Maoist variety), the
red legacy is no cutesy epiphenomena worthy simply of a cultural studies
or po-mo reading, but rather constitutes a body of linguistic and intellectual
practices that are profoundly ingrained in institutional behaviour and the
bricks and mortar of scholastic and cultural legitimisation. The on-the-
ground reality of the People’s Republic is that topics couched in Marxist-
Maoist terminology remain privileged within Chinese educational
institutions, among publishers, think tanks, and funding agencies. It is a living
legacy the spectre of which continues to hover over Chinese intellectual
life, be it for weal or for bane. And, as I have pointed out in the above, it is
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44. Tony Judt, “Goodbye to All That? Leszek Kołakowski and the Marxist Legacy,” in Reappraisals, Re-
flections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century, New York, The Penguin Press, 2008, p. 133.
45. Ibid.
46. Perhaps we may recall that Kołakowski’s scathing observation of the pursuit of Marxism by Eu-
ramerican intellectuals and academics: “One of the causes of the popularity of Marxism among
educated people was the fact that in its simple form it was very easy….an instrument that made
it possible to master all of history and economics without actually having to study either.” (Judt,
“Goodbye to All That?”, op. cit., p. 135.)
47. From Ari Daniel Levine, Divided by a Common Language: Factional Conflict in Late Northern Song
China, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008, pp. 49-50. For a somewhat different version
of Ouyang’s essay, and a lengthy discussion, see also James T.C. Liu, Ou-yang Hsiu: An Eleventh-
Century Neo-Confucianist, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, pp. 53ff.
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worth asking whether this particular red legacy does in fact leech out the
power of other modes of left-leaning critique and independent thought,
and only aid and abet the party-state’s pursuit of a neo-liberal economic
agenda.
Fellowships and factions
In 1044 CE, the Song-dynasty political figure and writer Ouyang Xiu 欧阳修
submitted a memorial to the throne entitled “On Factions” (Pengdanglun
朋党论). In it he argued against the long-standing taboo on coalitions in
government. He suggested to the throne that political groupings of like-
minded men working for the benefit of the court and its dynastic subjects
were in fact a constructive development. Regarded as the most famous ar-
gument in favour of political alliances in Chinese history, “On Factions” has
resonated through the ages.
In his memorial Ouyang said:
Thus, Your servant claims that petty men are without factions and
that only superior men have them. Why is this so? Official salaries
and gain are what petty men enjoy; wealth and goods are what petty
men covet. When they seek mutual gain, they will temporarily form
an affiliation (dang), but it is erroneous to consider them to be a fac-
tion (peng). When they glimpse gain and contend to be first [to take
it], or when the gains have been exhausted, and they squabble over
what remains, then they will cruelly injure each other. Even if they
are brothers or kinsmen, they will not be able to protect each other.
然臣谓小人无朋，惟君子有之。其故何哉？小人所好者利禄也，所
贪者财货也；当其同利时，暂相党引以为朋者，伪也。及其见利而
争先，或利尽而交疏，则反相贼害，虽其兄弟亲戚，不能相保。故
臣谓小人无朋，其暂为朋者，伪也。
…this is not so for superior men. The Way and righteousness are what
they defend; loyalty and sincerity are what they practice; and repu-
tation and integrity are what they value. Since they have cultivated
themselves, their common Way (tongdao) is of mutual benefit. Since
they serve the polity, their common hearts help each other, and they
are always as one. Such are the affiliations of superior men.
君子则不然。所守者道义，所形者忠义，所惜者名节；以之修身，
则同道而相益，以之事国，则同心而共济，终始如一。此君子之朋
也。 (47)
Mao Zedong was notorious for construing those with political differences
as being members of dangerous factions and alliances. He frequently warned
against the dangers of “cliques” (zongpai 宗派); he demonised his perceived
rivals as pursuing a political line invidious to the Chinese revolution, and he
was merciless first in toying with and then obliterating those whom he sus-
pected of having formed alliances in opposition to him. Differences in policy,
strategy, and even personality were depicted as “line struggles” (luxian
douzheng 路线斗争), and for decades the history of modern China as ac-
counted by the Communist Party was a record of such struggles.
In the landscape of authoritarian Chinese politics there has occasionally
been an attempt to recognise, if not formalise, the role of a “loyal opposi-
tion” in government. In the history of the Chinese Communist Party, which
celebrated its ninetieth anniversary on 1 July 2011, inner party factions were
outlawed, often in the most violent manner. Although the Chinese Commu-
nist Party may well maintain that China in the twenty-first century is led
by one party in coalition with other “democratic parties” (minzhu dangpai
民主党派) that contribute to the political process, the reality is that no quar-
ter is given to formal oppositionist politics.
In the realm of media and Internet contention, discussion in China is more
free-wheeling in many regards than during other periods of Party rule. Today,
however, major differences in policy are papered over or suppressed under
the guise of collective leadership. Line struggles are a Maoist relic; in their
place there is talk of “Party discipline” (dangji 党纪) and “state law” (guofa
国法). Whatever his disciplinary infractions or criminal misdeeds, Bo Xilai is
seen by some as being the victim of a Party “line struggle” aimed at purging
not only Bo and his associates, but even gestures towards a Maoist-era form
of egalitarianism. Ideological contestation has been occluded by a formal-
istic legal process. There is already talk of a “show trial.”
The historian F.W. Mote offered the following observation on Ouyang Xiu’s
Song-dynasty memorial and the problems that it highlighted for future gen-
erations. Mote’s comment is relevant to a discussion of political contesta-
tion under authoritarian rule in China even today:
The failure of Neo-Confucian thinkers and political activists to break
through this formal barrier against concerted political action by
groups of like-minded men, by disallowing any distinction between
good and bad factions, severely limited Chinese political behavior
thereafter, up to the end of the imperial era in the early twentieth
century… The attempt to redefine “factions” would arise again and
again, up to the eighteenth century, but the state’s definition always
prevailed. Legitimate political parties could not take form, and any
who expressed political disagreements were, by definition, morally
defective, hence insidious. “Loyal opposition” could not be acknowl-
edged within a system of politics defined by ethical and personal
rather than by operational and institutional norms. China still strug-
gles with the heritage of this eleventh-century political failure. (48)
A crimson blindfold
During the “history wars” in Australia that stretched out for a decade from
the mid 1990s, historians who brought to light through their research un-
palatable truths about the ugly colonisation of the country and the devas-
tation of its indigenous population were condemned by government leaders,
right-wing media commentators, and others claiming objectivity. The con-
cerned historians were derided for promoting a “black armband” view of
the past. Their historical perspective, one that by its very nature encouraged
a heartfelt recognition of a complex history of settlement and a thoughtful
reflection on its impact on the present, was seen as being a threat to na-
tional cohesion and more uplifting narratives of progress and modernity.
The power-holders and their media supporters were in turn chided for
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championing a “white blindfold” view of the national story. In China, the
blindfold is of a crimson hue.
Cosy theorising regarding a supposedly retrievable red legacy enjoyed a
regional boost during the short-lived “red renaissance” championed by Bo
Xilai and his supporters (political, military, and academic) until early 2012.
His ouster does not mean, however, that red culture is defunct. Some of the
motivating ideas, sentiments, and emotions of the Chinese revolution re-
main part of the fabric of life, and they find different levels of articulation
and resonance in society. To appreciate more cogently the valency of China’s
red-suffused heritage, the overlay and interplay of historical tropes, lan-
guage, practices, and evocations is, as I have argued in the above, important
for an appreciation of the multifaceted commerce between past and pres-
ent, traditions real and invented, and the evolution of contemporary ways
of being, seeing, and speaking in that country today.
Even in power Mao Zedong frequently spoke about the dangers of bour-
geois restoration and revisionism. He declared on a number of occasions
that he would have to go back into the mountains to lead a guerrilla war
against the power-holders, that rebellion was justified. While many discuss
the legacy of revolutionary politics in the cloistered security of academic
fora, that spirit of rebellion, the active involvement with a politics of agita-
tion, action, and danger, is one legacy that seems only safe to contemplate
at a distance. Restive farmers and workers in China may cloak themselves
in the language of defunct revolution, but evidence suggests that rather
than the crude categories of class struggle and revolutionary vanguards,
their metaphorical landscape is a complex mixture of traditional cultural
tropes, revolutionary discourse, and an awareness of modern rights and ways
to stretch social rules.
As we consider the steely determinism of the Marxist lesson, we can de-
tect how that historical determinism dovetails with articulations of a Chi-
nese “national mission” today. The necessity of history remains at the heart
of many attempts to find a more capacious meaning within the red legacy.
Indeed, as we consider the long tail of Maoism both in and outside of the
People’s Republic of China, we should be alert to the abiding allure and uses
of the crimson blindfold. After all, it is because of its nature as a belief sys-
tem – as a body of thought, practice, language, and cultural heritage – that
it forms part of China’s red legacy, a system that has proved serviceable in
the past and one that remains seductive, and useful, today.
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